

INDONESIA REPORTS - NO. 14, MARCH 1986

MILITARY PENETRATION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT: THE HIGHER CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY

John A. MacDougall

**"The military is not in power."
Gen. Benny Moerdani, October 11, 1985**

About five years ago, this writer made a detailed analysis of then current levels and patterns of military penetration into Indonesia's higher central bureaucracy.¹ The findings aroused considerable interest in, among other places, U.S. and Indonesian government circles. The present article, together with the appended raw data on which it is based, makes a preliminary attempt to update this earlier work. In an effort to discern trends accurately, the set of central bureaucratic offices studied in mid-February 1986 has deliberately been kept conceptually virtually the same as in the earlier mid-December 1981 collation, namely, the senior positions in the President's office and every Minister, Secretary-General, Inspector-General, and Director-General in all Cabinet Departments.²

To further comparability, the position of Presidential Household Head has been added to the earlier list since it is included in the present one (the occupant remained unchanged). Save for a Minister (then concurrently Armed Forces [ABRI] Commander) and Inspector-General, the Defense and Security Department (hereafter, Hankam) did not share at yearend 1981 the common senior administrative structures of other Departments. Rather than leave a glaring gap, the positions of Deputy Commander of ABRI/Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) Commander and Kopkamtib Chief-of-Staff were therefore equated to Secretary-Generals, while Hankam's three Chief-of-Staff positions (Operations, Administration, Non-Military Affairs) and the four Chief-of-Staff level service heads were equated to Director-Generals. Since President Soeharto ordered establishment in November 1983 of a Hankam administrative structure separate from ABRI, the current early 1986 collation includes only the now "regularized" senior Hankam hierarchy.

Offices covered in 1981 and 1986 were garnered directly from the 1981 and 1985 editions of the quasi-official Buku Alamat Pejabat Negara R.I., perhaps the closest approximation to an annual

¹John A. MacDougall, "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy," *Indonesia*, No. 33, April 1982, pp. 89-121. Some further analysis of the raw data in this article was undertaken by Donald K. Emmerson in his "Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 11, November 1983, pp. 1220-1241. Useful bibliographies on others' work and relevant primary sources follow each article.

²Other leading segments of the "state apparatus" will be studied in later articles.

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Indonesian government organization manual.³ Names of incumbents, their military or civilian status, any current military rank, and active or retired status (if military) were ascertained from press biographical data and numerous directories in the public domain.

This is about as close one can get to equivalence in selecting the universe of offices studied. The structural changes in Hankam's roster do result in a somewhat artificial drop in five positions (from 11 in 1981 to 6 in 1986, all occupied by military officers on both occasions), a point taken into account in the analysis below. In addition, no biographical data was readily available to determine if the current Trade Department Secretary-General should be coded as military, so he has been presumed to be civilian. Of the two major sorts of possible error--wrongly coding civilians as military and wrongly coding military officers as civilian--the latter is more likely, especially since the military status of many senior officials is rarely mentioned in the press except when their initial appointments are announced (or when they perish in office). Wrongly coding civilians as military would tend to occur mainly when two (or more) persons with the same name are involved. Indonesia Reports would appreciate receiving documentation on any misclassification discovered by readers.⁴

Extent of Military Penetration

Active and retired military officers now occupy 41% (67) of the 163 positions in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy. Specifically, these military "functionaries," referred to in New Order Indonesian as "karyawan," include:

- o the President (a retired four-star general),
- o 64% (16) of the President's principal 25 aides,
- o 38% (8) of 21 Department Ministers,
- o 67% (14) of 21 Secretary-Generals,
- o 67% (14) of 21 Inspector-Generals,
- o 20% (14) of 71 Director-Generals.

³Specifically, the offices were taken from Section 8 of the 1981 Buku Alamat and the comparable Sections 2 through 4 of the 1985 edition.

⁴Both data sets are stored in coded PFS:FILE diskette files readable using MS-DOS. Indonesia Reports also maintains a third current file which will be saved periodically for future trend analysis. Readers should be able to replicate the basic information in all files using the two published raw data sets and Indonesia Reports' monthly logs, where personnel changes in all these offices are recorded.

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Here are the principal trends:⁵

- o The higher central bureaucracy has swollen in size from 146 positions in 1981 to 163 in 1986, an increase of 12% which has further strengthened this pillar of state power. While the proportion of military occupants has fallen from 50% in 1981 to 41% in 1986, the percentage drop is mostly a function of the bureaucracy's increased size, with the absolute number of military karyawan staying almost constant. The small apparent reduction in the number of military incumbents (from 73 in 1981 to 67 in 1986) is mainly a statistical artifact due to the exclusion of the four service Chief-of-Staff positions from the 1986 Hankam roster. The "real" reduction is consequently just two persons.
- o The President remains military (from 1967 on). The Vice-President (whenever the post was not left vacant) was a civilian until 1983, when Soeharto chose long-time intimate Gen. (Ret.) Umar Wirahadikusumah as the New Order's first military occupant of this office.
- o The President's major State Secretariat aides remain overwhelmingly military (all 8 in 1971, 8 of 9 in 1981, 8 of 9 in 1986).
 - o Earlier counterparts of today's Coordinating Ministers were less likely to be military (1 of 5 in 1966, 0 of 3 in 1971, 2 of 3 in 1981, 2 of 3 in 1986).
- o Ministers of State, with their specialized responsibilities, had generally been wholly civilian (1971 and 1981), but 30% (3) of the ten persons with this status currently are military. In the Fourth Development Cabinet, Soeharto for the first time awarded this status to the ABRI Commander, the Attorney-General (military), and the Governor of Bank Indonesia (civilian). In addition, Soeharto brought Gen. (Ret.) Jusuf, Chairman of the State Audit Board, into the Cabinet, but without any sort of ministerial rank.
- o Junior Ministerial positions held by military incumbents have increased (from 33% in 1981 to 40% in 1986).
- o The proportion of Department Ministers who are military has dropped to levels characterizing the beginning of the New Order (44% in 1966-67, 38% in 1986⁶) from an all-time post-independence high in the Third Development Cabinet (47% in 1981). The latest slight percentage decline has been achieved by increasing the number of such Ministerial posts (from 16 in 1981 to 21 in 1986), but the absolute number of military Ministers remained constant (8 in both years⁷). Moreover, the current proportion (38%) of military Ministers still significantly exceeds what may have been a New Order

⁵The available earlier reference points derive from tallies by Harold Crouch for August 1966, Donald Emmerson for 1967, and MacDougall for 1971. See "Patterns..." for precise citations.

⁶The 1986 figure would have been 43% had not Education and Culture Minister Brig. Gen. Nugroho Notosusanto died in office during 1985 and been replaced by civilian Fuad Hassan.

⁷There would have been an absolute increase to 9 had Nugroho not died.

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low in 1971 (22%).

- o The proportion of military-held Secretary-Generalships has decreased from an historic high (89% in 1981, 67% in 1986) but remains substantially above levels in the early New Order (55% in 1966-67, 41% in 1971). The decline in absolute numbers of military Secretary-Generals (from 16 in 1981 to 14 in 1986) is essentially attributable to the exclusion of the two senior Kopkamtib posts from this year's Hankam roster. (ABRI Commander/Minister of State Gen. Moerdani also commands Kopkamtib and has additionally declined to fill its heretofore occupied Chief-of-Staff position.)

- o The proportion of military-held Inspector-Generalships has remained fairly constant (65% in 1981, 67% in 1986) at high levels somewhat lower than when these posts were still being created (73% in 1971, when only some Departments had them). Over time, the absolute number of military Inspector-Generals has continued to increase (8 in 1981, 11 in 1981, 14 in 1986).

- o Director-Generalships held by the military have significantly fallen to a probable New Order low (20% in 1986, from 36% in 1966, 36% in 1971, 35% in 1981) only partly attributable to the increase in such positions (from 64 to 71) over the last two Cabinets.

At the highest levels, military penetration (in relative percentage terms) has thus remained constant and near complete (the President, his major State Secretariat aides, his Coordinating Ministers). Penetration has increased in three position categories (Vice-President, Ministers of State, Junior Minister), remained relatively constant in another while increasing in absolute terms (Inspector-General), diminished in relative but not absolute terms in two others (Department Minister, Secretary-General), and declined in both relative and absolute terms only in the category with least power (Director-General). In short, the pattern of strong military dominance of the higher central bureaucracy has remained intact over the past five years and consolidated at levels usually equaling or exceeding those in the early New Order. The only practical evidence of a possible gradual civilianization process occurs in the recent one-time drop in the proportion of military Director-Generals. It is plain that the military as an institution does not intend to relinquish its domination of the higher central bureaucracy.

The Structure of Military Domination

In carrying out its self-proclaimed dual military and political functions (the *dwi fungsi* doctrine), the Indonesian military has not felt it necessary to place its men in uniform numbers in all Departments. "Total" domination has not been a regime goal. Perceived needs to control certain Departments, or specific positions within them, have also varied over time. "Vital" positions have been subject to some redefinition. The personalities of Ministers and Soeharto's personal agenda also appear to play some part in determining the military-civilian mix within Departments.

A key measure of military penetration of Departments is the proportion of slots, from the relevant Coordinating Minister down to Directors-Generals, filled by military officers. Using this gauge, the most crucial Department for regime maintenance is Hankam, 100% of its leading positions military-

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occupied in 1986. Examination of Hankam rosters for 1966, 1971, and 1981 shows that ABRI in the New Order has never held less than 90% of these positions. Hankam remains the most penetrated Department. However, an important departure from preceding years is that retired (as opposed to active-duty) 1945 Generation officers hold the four major positions (plus one of the three Director-Generalships) in the administrative command chain: Coordinating Minister, Minister, Secretary-General, Inspector-General. Hankam will not simply become an abundant source of jobs for pensioned officers of Soeharto's generation, but may well become one of the important means by which he and his closest intimates hope to retain control over ABRI given their common abiding doubts, on some sensitive grounds, of the ultimate loyalties of many, perhaps even most, young generation (*generasi muda*) officers.

The other important Department necessary to regime maintenance is Interior (*Dalam Negeri*). In early 1986, over half (55%) the leading command chain positions (including Coordinating Minister, Minister, Secretary-General, and two of five Director-Generalships) were indeed held by Army officers. Four of these are retired 1945 generation men. The fifth (Brig. Gen. Harisoegiman) has been a personal assistant to arch-Soeharto loyalist and former Kopkamtib Commander, Admiral (Ret.) Sudomo. An interesting change is the drop in Interior's 1981 highest-ever level of military penetration, reversing the unique rise here in military penetration over the course of the New Order (29% in 1966, 71% in 1971, 89% in 1981). The reversal coincided with a shift in Ministers from Gen. (Ret.) Amirmachmud to Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Soepardjo Roestam. Amirmachmud is one of three generals who played a key role in getting Soekarno to relinquish his presidential powers to Soeharto in 1966 and has an often threatening, doctrinaire personality. Soepardjo's rise is partially credited to former Vice-President Adam Malik, and he has a far more amiable public demeanor, a possible factor in his appointment. Probably he finds himself considerably more comfortable working with civilian subordinates than Amirmachmud, and this fact is reflected in his staffing pattern.

As judged by Departments with 50% or more of the top administrative command chain positions held by the military, there appears to have been some shift in other Departments seen as "vital" by Soeharto. At yearend 1981, the highly penetrated Departments included Information (57%), Social Affairs (57%), Communications (56%), Religion (56%), Justice (50%), Foreign Affairs (50%), and Manpower and Transmigration (50%). By early 1986, the list had become Social Affairs (57%), Communications (50%), Foreign Affairs (50%), Manpower (50%), Cooperatives (50%), and Health (50%). The shifts upward for at least Cooperatives and Health, the continued high penetration of Social Affairs, and the shifts downward for Information and Religion tend to refute the simplistic view that the degree of military penetration is wholly a function of attempted regime maintenance. (The drop in Justice was marginal, from 50% in 1981 to 43% in 1986.) Of the highly penetrated Departments in 1981 and 1986, this hypothesis seems defensible only, perhaps, for Foreign Affairs and Manpower (and maybe, ultimately, only for Hankam and Interior).

More decisive in many cases may simply be the collegial preferences of military Ministers and the personal predilections of Soeharto. Five of the seven most penetrated Departments in 1981 (in addition to Hankam and Interior) were run by military Ministers. In 1986 the corresponding figure had become four of six (again in addition to Hankam and Interior). Information, which registered the

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largest military penetration decline of any Department (outside Interior), from 57% in 1981 to 29% in 1986, underwent a Ministerial change from domineering New Order architect Gen. (Ret.) Ali Moertopo to merely wily civilian Harmoko in which every position in the command chain save one had a new incumbent. The exception was the polite but dreaded chief press censor, Director-General Soekarno, whose replacement was, in fact, named in the press but then withdrawn for reasons which remain suitably nebulous.

Soeharto's own ideological preferences are perhaps seen in his elevation of a civilian-led Directorate-General for Cooperatives to a full-fledged, military-led Department. His whimsical favor is evident in the naming of his long-time (1969-1983) personal doctor Brig. Gen. Mardjono Poerbonegoro to be Inspector-General of Health. The top spots in Social Affairs generally seem to be prime examples of patronage jobs for the "old boys," ironically reinforced by his naming one of the three token women (all Javanese) in the higher central bureaucracy to be the Departmental Minister from 1983.⁸ Finally, the fairly sizable decline in military penetration of Religion (from 56% in 1981 to 33% in 1986) may simply reflect Soeharto's decision to handle religious dissent decisively through the covert Kopkamtib channel as the controversial measure to make Pancasila the sole basis of all social organizations stirred up expectedly strong religious dissent throughout 1984 and 1985.

Save for Public Works, there now remains no Department in which one or more military karyawan is not suitably placed to control and/or remain apprised of its full range of activities. In nine Departments the military occupies both the Secretary-General and Inspector-General positions (Foreign Affairs, Hankam, Cooperatives, Industry, Manpower, Transmigration, Education and Culture, Health, Social Affairs). In five other Departments, at least the Secretary-General is military (Interior, Information, Finance,⁹ Mining and Energy, Religion). In five more, at least the Inspector-General is military (Trade, Agriculture, Forestry, Communications, and Tourism, Posts, and Telecommunications). In one (Justice) without a military Secretary-General or Inspector-General, the Minister is military. These patterns are nearly identical to those evident in 1981.

The enlargement of the Departmental segment of the central bureaucracy by Soeharto after his re-designation as President in 1983 was accomplished almost wholly by breaking up Departments falling under the aegis of newly-appointed civilian Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance, and Industry (Ekuin) Ali Wardhana. Specifically, the Trade and Cooperatives, Communications, and Agriculture Departments were each split.¹⁰ In addition, the Manpower and Transmigration

⁸Social Affairs Minister Nani Soedarsono, who is married to a retired Army Colonel.

⁹Long-time Budget Director-General Jusuf Ramli is a retired Army Major General. Perhaps not just coincidentally, the last two Chairmen of the DPR's Budget Commission were Brig. Gen. (Police) (Ret.) A. Wiratno Puspoatmodjo S.H. and Maj. Gen. (Police) (Ret.) Rahardjo (incumbent).

¹⁰Into Trade, Cooperatives, Agriculture, Forestry, Communications, and Tourism, Posts, and Telecommunications.

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Department was removed from the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare portfolio and given to Wardhana in bifurcated form. Finally, the former Directorate-General for State Monetary Control was hived off the Finance Department and made a non-Departmental state institution called the Development and Finance Supervision Board (BPKP, Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan, remaining under the incredibly frank, dedicated, and incorruptible Drs. Gandhi) and placed at the apex service of "clean" retired senior Army Generals Vice-President Umar and State Audit Board Chairman Jusuf. A major effect of these administrative transformations, together with some other appointment shifts, was to continue the widely discerned trend toward a more rationalized, energized, and coercive (vis-a-vis the society) higher central bureaucracy.

As gauged roughly by personal usage of titles and the likely variant policy interests associated with them, there appear to be more built-in tendencies toward internal conflict, though probably not yet "pluralism," in the higher central bureaucracy in 1986 than in 1981. An overall rise in the educational level and heterogeneity of this elite seems reflected in the numerous articulated intra-bureaucratic rivalries recorded in the Indonesian press. Lawyers (S.H.) have increased from 14% to 17% of the total. In both years 12 military lawyers, just over half the legal total in 1981 and just under half in 1986, could be counted among them. The proportion of engineers (Ir.) has also risen from 14% to 17%. While no firm figures are available, engineers of various stripes seem to outnumber professional economists by a substantial amount, with the margin increasing in 1986. Persons who use standard academic degree titles (Drs., several Master's designations, Dr.) shot up from 29% to 39%. Only the proportion of self-identified academicians (Prof.) has declined, dropping from 12% to 10%.

The Successor Generation Crisis

At yearend 1981, the 1945 Generation officers, participants in the 1945-49 Revolution (or as they prefer to call it these days, the War for Independence), held literally a near monopoly on the military karyawan positions in the higher central bureaucracy. Just two officers known to have been born after 1930 could be located among them. This writer consequently predicted, "Any voluntary change of generation of generation (alih generasi) within the phalanx of military karyawan is remote over the next five years. If such a generational succession among these karyawan has even been planned, it is not a subject of general public discussion as is the succession for active duty military in the staff and command structure."¹¹ This forecast appears to have been correct.

The proportion of retired military karyawan (almost all from the 1945 Generation, with a few from the misnamed "bridging" generation) actually rose from approximately 67% in 1981 to 78% in 1986. Some of these officers retained their posts over the period and were pensioned (by ABRI) in place, while others were brought in by Soeharto after they had retired. There are only 8 active-duty Army officers among the military karyawan in the central bureaucracy as of February 1986. (The less militarily and politically important Air Force, Navy, and Police are represented by 4, 3, and zero active-duty officers, respectively.) Of these 8, at least five were due to retire within a year (or have apparently remained on the active rolls past the normal retirement age of 55). Of the others, only

¹¹MacDougall, op. cit., p. 105.

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Maj. Gen. Syaukat Banjarsari has held senior command positions (including Kostrad Chief-of-Staff). He is also the only identifiable graduate in the higher central bureaucracy from the Military Academy at Magelang (Class 1, 1960). His appointment just occurred in February 1986. Moreover, he had served previously in a highly sensitive position (Head of the Presidential Security Bureau) in the same office (Presidential Military Secretary) and in a more than figurative sense now functions exceptionally as "palace guard." The conclusion is irresistible that Soeharto still does not wish to have his fellow 1945 Generation officers relinquish their control of the critical, and for that matter, non-critical positions they hold in the higher central bureaucracy. Public discussion has been confined to moving young generation officers into politically impotent legislative karyawan jobs.

This writer also previously forecast that Soeharto's superintending of ABRI's dual function would bring about a unique power configuration. "The overall design thus eventually would entail two major power centers: the retired military karyawan of the 1945 Generation in the higher central bureaucracy and the active duty Army staff and command structure of the Young Generation. For some indeterminate period of time the cleavage between the retired Army officers in control of politics and the active duty Army officers in control of the guns would therefore be sharply drawn. The formula for regime maintenance would essentially be shifted from depoliticization to repoliticization."¹² With only a very few key 1945 and bridging generation officers remaining at ABRI's helm,¹³ this situation is now virtually at hand. Soeharto appears determined to prolong it at least through the 1987 elections, after which his options will decline sharply since in five years nearly all the senior 1945 Generation officer cohort will be dead. How the young generation commanders will play their increasingly strong hands is a matter which must weigh heavily on Soeharto's mind as he contemplates his continuing distrust of all but a chosen few among them.

It seems most unlikely to this writer that the politically astute young generation commanders have not already long sized up the situation along these and other less than satisfactory lines and are simply figuring the most expeditious manner to claim the full national political role they seem convinced is historically rightfully theirs. The crucial part played in the overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines by young reformist professional officers, a matter much mooted in Jakarta, could now widen the range of options for regime succession under consideration by Indonesia's successor generation in and outside the officer corps. The Soeharto era may not yet end in the way the master *dalang* has choreographed it.

¹²MacDougall, op. cit., p. 106.

¹³For the most comprehensive and current analysis of the generational transition within ABRI's high command, see Ben Anderson, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," **Indonesia**, No. 40, October 1985, pp. 131-164.