Bugis migrants from South Sulawesi, Indonesia, have been at the center of several recent regional conflicts. In order to explain their role in these conflicts, historic and ethnographic accounts of Bugis migration and settlement, as well as interviews with recently repatriated migrants, are presented, and current theories of frontier/state relations are brought to bear. This article suggests that Bugis migrants have often acted as agents of assimilation in concert with existing elites, and that this pattern has become anachronistic in post-Suharto Indonesia. (Indonesia, Bugis, migration, ethnic groups, conflict)

Observers of Indonesian society have frequently commented on its seemingly extraordinary ability to hold itself together in spite of its geographic fragmentation and sociocultural diversity. The recent eruption of violent ethnic and religious conflicts has shown us how very real the problem of national integration is in Indonesia. With the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and the granting of independence to East Timor in 1999, other long-suppressed separatist movements are re-emerging. Within the framework of assimilation, this article addresses questions concerning the role of migration and the settlement of peoples outside their homelands as a factor in the economic and political integration of the region and the Indonesian state.¹

This essay is informed by my research on Bugis migration, by the ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, especially between Bugis migrants and local populations in East Timor, West Timor, Ambon, Central Sulawesi, and West Papua, and by Kopytoff’s (1987) and Scott’s (1998a, 1998b) models for the historical understanding of frontiers and their relationship to metropoles. It relies upon the historical and ethnographic accounts of the Bugis, both in their homeland of South Sulawesi and in the diaspora, as well as press accounts of recent ethnic conflicts between Bugis and indigenous ethnic groups in East Timor, West Timor, Ambon, and West Papua. As such, it is meant to help clarify the social and cultural forces that give rise to these conflicts and to provide the basis for further research on a problem critical to the future of the Indonesian nation and the safety and security of its ethnically diverse population.

One of the region’s largest and most widely dispersed ethnic groups, the Bugis, whose homeland is South Sulawesi, has helped shape the processes of regional and national integration and disintegration, past and present. Over several centuries, Bugis migrants and settlers have developed a reputation for their ability to insinuate themselves into and eventually dominate local economies and social orders. In particular, the history of Bugis migration is best understood through a frontier model in which, as Scott (1999) has suggested, Southeast Asian states have encouraged assimilation as a means to control populations. Ironically, as I will show, the
sensibility of migrants has not been one of mere assimilation into existing social orders. Rather, Bugis migrants more often reconstruct their own social orders based upon their own shared beliefs and practices in a manner described by Kopytoff (1987). Specifically, from the early colonial period through the end of Suharto’s New Order, Bugis migrants have extensively allied with elites and acted as agents of assimilation, imposing upon local peoples ways they promoted as economically and politically progressive and socially and culturally correct. Unfortunately, their alliance with the New Order was a major factor in the current wave of ethnic and religious conflict, causing thousands of migrants and a large number of Bugis settlers to flee the violence.

FRONTIERS AND THE NEW SOCIAL ORDERS

Kopytoff’s (1987) introduction to The African Frontier presents a brilliantly cogent model for the historical understanding of frontiers and their relationship to metropoles in sub-Saharan Africa. Kopytoff (1987:14) characterizes the frontier as “permissive rather than determinant; it does not create a type of society and culture but provides instead an institutional vacuum for the unfolding of social processes.” Socially and politically constructed by the nearby societies from which the frontiersmen originate, frontiers are defined by those societies as lacking any legitimate political institutions and as being open to legitimate intrusion and settlement—this even if the areas are in fact occupied by organized polities. ... [As such,] the frontier is above all a political fact, a matter of a political definition of a geographical space ... where the frontiersman could literally construct a desirable social order. They came to the frontier not with a sociological and political tabula rasa, to be shaped by its forests and plains, but with a mental model of a good society. The elements of the model went well into the past. (Kopytoff 1987:11)

Since at least the seventeenth century, Bugis migrants, often in alliances with local nobilities and colonial and national authorities, have settled both at metropoles and in frontiers, where they willfully neglected the social institutions of local peoples. In several cases, the Bugis allied themselves with local nobles, settling close to the center of the polity and eventually insinuating themselves into the ruling elite. In other cases, it was noble, colonial, or state authorities whose neglect of indigenous peoples enabled Bugis migrants to settle and eventually dominate local societies. The first and greatest migration of Bugis occurred in the late seventeenth century as a result of war in their homeland, establishing a pattern of migration that the Bugis describe as massapa dallé (mencari rejeki in Indonesian) (searching for good fortune). Like Kopytoff’s (1987) frontier men and women in Africa, the Bugis have moved and settled in groups, initially made up of members of the same kin group. These groups were most often led by members of the lower nobility, attracting entourages which included non-kin, usually from the same ancestral area of South Sulawesi, as well as local people who were incorporated into patron-client and other vertical relationships. Finally, these groups, like those mentioned by Kopytoff,
brought with them a political and economic culture and a model of a legitimate social order which they often imposed upon indigenous populations.

The pattern of migration and settlement that Bugis have followed for nearly three centuries has relied upon the establishment of real and de-facto alliances with existing authorities, and at the close of the twentieth century the failure of state authority left many Bugis settlers exposed to the pent-up frustrations of long-neglected indigenous peoples. Their “search for good fortune” continues to motivate those Bugis who decided to return to South Sulawesi to escape the recent violence, as I will demonstrate.

Building upon his extensive exploration of the ways by which states take control of culturally and geographically peripheral populations, Scott (1998a, 1998b) suggests that the history of Southeast Asian statecraft—precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial—shows a pattern of states literally constructing frontiers by seeking to dominate, domesticate, and “make legible” nonstate spaces (Scott 1999). During the precolonial and much of the colonial period, land was plentiful, freedom was equated with physical mobility, and, therefore, the power of states was “predicated largely on the control of population rather than territory” (Scott 1998a:50). However, the peoples who live far from state centers have always been envisioned by those who live near the centers “as exemplars of nature, barbarity, rudeness, disorder, immorality and irreligion against which the culture, civilization, sophistication, order, morality and orthodoxy of the centre could be measured” (Scott 1998a:54). In Island Southeast Asia, it has more often been the Javanese who saw themselves as the center in contrast to the less civilized inhabitants of the “outer islands.” It follows, then, that states have both the right and responsibility to bring civilization to nonstate spaces and peoples, to assimilate them into the dominant society and culture. Thus viewed, frontiers are “best seen as a place that is always being produced, as the social and economic consequence of state-making projects” (Scott 1999:45).

As an example, Scott (1999:3) points out that assimilation was historically encouraged in the Malay world by accepting as “Malay” anyone willing to embrace Islam, learn to speak Malay, and follow Malay customs, including customary law (adat). Early in their history, he suggests, this would have served to assimilate seafarers and traders into coastal kingdoms which relied on their loyalty to flourish. I would add that in the modern state of Malaysia, where assimilation has been seen as an essential element in achieving national integration, it has even become a point of law. That is, any citizen can officially become a Malay and thereby gain certain economic and legal privileges by demonstrating that he or she has embraced these three practices.

I argue that Bugis migration constitutes an important counterpoint to Scott’s analysis: the focus here is not upon particular states and their often ill-fated efforts at controlling populations, but on a particular ethnic group for whom migration and settlement historically was an evolving response by its members in their attempts to exploit state projects that encouraged assimilation as a means of social control. Motivated not merely to assimilate into existing social orders but to recreate their
own, Bugis migrants have worked to maintain political and moral authority, not only over other migrant Bugis, but also over the indigenous peoples among whom they settled. Often successful in the past, more recently this pattern has proven quite problematic for both local populations and Bugis migrants themselves.

HISTORY

The Bugis of South Sulawesi are one of the most notorious among the seafaring peoples who have plied their trade along the coastlines of Southeast Asia. Forced out of their homeland by the thousands in the aftermath of the Dutch-Makassar Wars of the late seventeenth century, the Bugis used the ships they owned and the overseas connections they had already established to open new trade centers and settle in new lands all across Southeast Asia. As migrants, they are known for their hard work and success in opening formerly unexploited economic niches by clearing new agricultural lands, developing fisheries, and establishing small businesses. While the Bugis have made a significant contribution to economic integration across the region from the standpoint of political integration and state formation, the history of Bugis migration and settlement is far more problematic. Bugis migrants have gained a reputation for not being content to simply assimilate into their new surroundings or even to isolate themselves, but rather more often to first penetrate and then dominate existing communities.

Like other coastal communities prior to European incursion, the Bugis and Makassar not only traded their own surpluses, but forged trading links with inland communities. These latter first provided forest products and later the labor power, both voluntary and coerced, to develop agriculture (primarily rice) for the growing coastal communities and surpluses for trade. Initially, these surpluses appear to have been sold to Malay and Javanese traders who had earlier developed and dominated interisland trade. Substantial Makassar and Bugis involvement in this regional trade network came rather late, resulting from the fall of the port of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511 and the subsequent diversion of much of that trade to the new warehouse and distribution center at the port of Makassar.

As their kingdoms grew in wealth and power by controlling trade, the Makassar and then the Bugis moved to profit from all aspects of archipelagic trade, including the ownership and crewing of large trading ships. Further opportunities opened to the Makassar and Bugis during the first half of the seventeenth century as the Dutch in Batavia, in an attempt to control their monopoly on the spice trade, curbed the activities of Javanese traders (e.g., Andaya 1981; Pelras 1996; Schriek 1955-57).

During this period, Makassar and Bugis traders freely roamed the archipelago from the east coast of mainland Southeast Asia to the Philippines, New Guinea, and the north coast of Australia. Searching for cargos, they followed the monsoon winds—eastward between November and March and westward from April through October—returning home for only short periods each year to repair and refit their ships. Thus, they became a vital link in regional and global trade, connecting affluent
consumers in China and Europe with the exotic products of swidden farmers and forest foragers of the eastern islands and northern Australia.

In the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch turned their attention to Makassar, which, under the control of the dual kingdom of Goa and Tallo', had become the greatest threat to their monopoly on the spice trade. Failing to gain control through treaty, the Dutch declared war on Makassar and succeeded in capturing it, first in 1667 and again in 1669. Allied with the Dutch were the Bugis states of Boné and Soppeng, which were intent on punishing Goa for its earlier enslavement of thousands of their people to build infrastructure at Makassar.

Although the more northerly Bugis state of Wajo' was also allied by treaty with Boné, its leaders had joined with Makassar against the Dutch. In retribution, the legendary prince of Boné and commander of its troops, Arung Palakka, moved against Wajo' in 1670. As a result of this war and its aftermath, an exodus of Makassar and Bugis (especially the Bugis of Wajo') began which was to heavily influence the integration of the entire region for the next 300 years.

Many of the pasompe' (frontiersmen or settled foreigners) who fled Sulawesi in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries sailed west, where they affiliated with local leaders as settlers or as mercenaries in battles against traditional and emergent rivals, such as the Dutch. Because these migrations were led by members of high Bugis nobility, many of whom could succeed to rule in their homeland, they were given land to settle as well as economic and military control over their settlements. As Acciaioli (1989:49) points out, "It was precisely the high nobles of the defeated lands whose primary occupation in the [South Sulawesi] peninsula—governance—had been rendered impracticable along traditional lines. So, they fled to exercise control elsewhere."

And exercise control they did, gaining power through both military might and strategic marriages, even as they competed for regional trade. In a classic case of penetration and hegemonic control, Bugis nobles and their followers fled to the Riau archipelago near the Johor court, strategically centered at the intersection of local and international trade routes. From there they moved to compete with the Dutch for control of tin exports, which arrived by river at various points along the Malay peninsula. By establishing control of the mouths of the rivers and ports, the Bugis were for a time able to dominate trade in this region (Pelras 1996). Meanwhile, Bugis nobles attached themselves to the Rajahdom of Johor and the Riau Archipelago as mercenaries, and through marriage were able to establish not only their progeny’s right to rule, but also their claim as legitimate guardians of true Malay customs and customary law through the rewriting of local chronicles and histories. In this way the Bugis became the “custodians of pure Malay culture” and “champions” against foreign (that is, European and Chinese) corruption, and it was the Bugis interpretation of that culture which nineteenth-century Dutch scholars recorded as “exemplary forms of ‘Malayness’” (Matheson 1986:6). Moreover, when the Riau sultanate decided to reinstate traditional adat, it sent a delegation to Sulawesi to find out the proper procedures (Acciaioli, pers. comm.). Note that this appears to be the same
Malayness to which Scott (1999:3) refers in his argument concerning the ease of assimilation at that time. If, as Scott claims, Malayness was “simply the terms of cultural accommodation necessary to the creation of a cosmopolitan minisate at the coast,” then it was the Bugis, not the Malays, who appear to have been dictating those terms.

Pelras (1996) describes a second and similar example of Bugis penetration, that of the Samarinda Bugis under the leadership of La Ma’dukelleng, a prince of Wajo’. La Ma’dukelleng fiercely opposed the Dutch and their allies from Bone who had defeated his people in the Dutch-Makassar Wars. Retreating from the ravages of occupation, he led about 3,000 Bugis across the Strait of Makassar to Pasir on the east coast of Kalimantan before returning to Sulawesi in 1737 to wage a fight against the allied forces. Pasir was attractive because of its already-established community of Wajo’ Bugis, and La Ma’dukelleng quickly took control.

In east Borneo, La Ma’dukelleng concluded political matrimonial alliances with local rulers just as he would have done in his home country; thus he married one of his sons to one of the Sultan of Pasir’s daughters and, later, their daughter to Sultan Idris of Kutai, while he himself became Sultan of Pasir. He was also active in organizing further Wajo’ communities all down the east coast of Borneo, each under its elected chiefs. Having obtained from the previous Sultan of Kutai the right of settlement for Bugis in Samarinda, a strategic settlement near the mouth of the Mahakam river, somewhat downriver from the Kutai capital, he later also obtained from Sultan Idris monopoly rights over the export of products from the hinterland, including gold-dust, benzoin, camphor, damar, gaharu wood, rattan, birds’-nests, beeswax, bezoe stones and rhinoceros horn (for which, however, only Kutai Malays were permitted to trade upriver), and of sea products such as tortoiseshell, turtles’ eggs, agar-agar and trepang. The Samarinda Bugis also had the monopoly on imports of rice, salts, spices, coffee, tobacco, opium, chinaware, textiles, iron firearms, saltpeter and slaves. (Pelras 1996:321-22)

The right to self-government was also accorded the Samarinda Bugis, and titles were granted to several of the Bugis leaders, making it possible for them to intermarry with members of the local sultanate. Interestingly, and consistent with Kopytoff’s frontier model, they chose to organize themselves in a manner that reinvented the political structure that they left behind in Wajo’, democratically selecting a chief who was accountable to a council of rich sea traders (nakhoda). Eventually, they gained control of the upriver trade and the port itself.

While emphasizing that the circumstances surrounding each particular Bugis settlement differed, Pelras (1996) explains that during the eighteenth century this general mode of penetration was successfully practiced in Sumatra and Riau, on both the east and west coasts of Borneo, in Sumbawa and Ende on Flores, and near the major ports of Java. Scattering themselves across the region, the Bugis and Makassar gained a reputation among both indigenous peoples and European commentators as intrepid and even ruthless in their determination and success in dominating trade and in colonization. As Ricklefs (1981:63) observes, with perhaps some exaggeration, when one attempts to consider the enormous extent of Bugis and Makassar military and trade activity from the point of view of the peoples who suffered their depredations and the Dutch colonial forces who were fighting to restrain them, it is
easy to conclude along with them that "well into the eighteenth century these fierce warriors were the scourge of the archipelago."

From another point of view, however, it was the Dutch (and 200 years later the newly independent Indonesian government) who both forced the Bugis from their homeland and created the conditions that allowed the Bugis to take control, whether directly or indirectly, in many coastal areas of both the western and eastern archipelago. It was the Dutch, after all, who destroyed traditional political structures in Sulawesi and elsewhere, and it was the Dutch who, by their policy of partial subjugation of the islands of the archipelago over which they claimed sovereignty, provided so much open space for Bugis settlement. Dutch policy thus inadvertently enabled the Bugis, especially those from Wajo', to develop a trade and settlement network that posed serious competition to the Dutch in the eighteenth century. By 1820, the Bugis dominated internal trade which extended from New Guinea to Sumatra and continued to play a major role in growing international trade between Europe and the eastern islands.

Abidin (pers. comm.) describes the "three tips" (tellu cappa) by which Bugis settlers are said to have penetrated and insinuated themselves into existing polities (see also Acciaioli 1999). These tips are the tip of the tongue used for diplomacy, the tip of the penis used in marriage, and the tip of the knife blade resorted to in battle. It was through various combinations of these tips that the Bugis, over a span of two centuries, were able to build alliances with local sultans, settle and develop adjacent land, and produce frontier versions of the Bugis kingdoms of Sulawesi. Taking advantage of their literacy and worldliness, they were often able to presume to represent the interests of these polities and even gain control and refashion the sultanates in their own image.

A SHIFT TO AGRICULTURE AND NEW ALLIANCES

While the majority of Bugis migrants were still engaged in trade until the late nineteenth century, the Dutch gradually managed to take control. Meanwhile, the introduction of the steamship and the opening of the Suez Canal increased demand in Europe for tropical agricultural products, encouraging the opening of new agricultural land for cash crops. Facing decreasing trade opportunities, many Bugis engaged in a new wave of settlement, most often clearing land adjacent to earlier Bugis settlements, where they cultivated coconuts for copra and other cash crops such as rubber and rice. Between 1885 and 1920, taking advantage of market opportunities as they developed, the Bugis, along with migrants from Java, Madura, and Borneo, cleared large tracts of forest for plantations in Johor, Malaya, and Sumatra (Pelras 1996:315ff.; see also Acciaioli 1998). For example, it was aboard Bugis ships that the first Javanese contract laborers were brought to Johor to work on the new plantations of a rich Arab Johor family. The highly astute and progressive Sultan of Johor, still independent from the British, had instituted a land settlement and development scheme that would open large areas of forest and swamp land at very
low cost to plantation agriculture. The first to take advantage of this opportunity were overseas Chinese and Javanese who had come to work as contract laborers on the Arab family's estate and who settled this new land and planted it mostly with rubber trees. Word spread through the captains and crews of these ships, and soon Bugis migrants arrived to clear and settle land between the rubber plantations and the shore, a niche well suited to growing coconut trees.

Among these first Bugis settlers were some from Pontianak on the island of Borneo, where they had already gained experience in the cultivation of coconut trees and the copra trade. There they had learned that coconuts required less work, once planted, than rubber, and they also knew that this land was much better than that which they left behind in Pontianak. Mostly natives of Wajo', these settlers sailed on Bugis ships; each group was headed by a patron (who belonged to either the middle nobility or the sea trading class, or both) who had start-up capital (tools, seeds, etc.), and who was later able to lend money on cheap terms to followers who wanted to open their own plantations. From the outset they could mobilize the labor power of poorer relatives and slaves whom they directed first to plant subsistence crops, which were to be abandoned once coconuts came in. Later, during World War I, when the price of coconuts dropped and that of rice increased, many Bugis moved to Sumatra and opened land to rice cultivation (Lineton 1975).

Since 1988, my research has been with a community of Bugis whose ancestors settled in the late nineteenth century on a coral isle in the Sabalana Archipelago, 100 miles south of Makassar. Balobaloang, like many of the other islands of the archipelago, had long been seen as an untamed frontier by the Dutch administration, a place where navy and cargo ships could find safe harbor, good fishing, and potable water, but also a place from which local, probably Bugis, pirates could stage raids against colonial ships. Thus, in an effort to pacify the area, in the 1870s, the Dutch invited a Bugis ally, H. LaHamade' Daeng Pasori, to bring his family and other members of his entourage to settle Balobaloang and other nearby islands. As the first gallarrang (title holder) of Balobaloang, a title bestowed upon him by the Dutch administrator, LaHamade' was given control of all but twelve of the Sabalana Islands (which remained under the control of the Dutch) and was sold four of them, three of which were planted with coconut trees (Ammarell 1999).

Today, the Bugis of Balobaloang rely on a mixed economy of coconut horticulture and small-scale sea trade, supplemented in harder times by commercial fishing from their dugouts and ships. Emblematic of the Bugis who remained in South Sulawesi during the first half of the twentieth century, the Bugis of Balobaloang, operating more or less within colonial law, cleared the forest to plant first banana and then coconut trees, and fished for both subsistence and trade, all the while building larger and larger ships by which they could earn increasingly greater profits as they plied their trade from Sumatra to Papua and Kalimantan to Maluku (Ammarell 1999). Interestingly, direct descendants of LaHamade' still own and profit from the coconut trees on three of these islands.
As Pelras (1996) points out, unlike their predecessors who had penetrated the royal courts near to where they settled, these migrant agriculturalists, fishers, and traders (as well as thousands more who settled in Sumatra between 1950 and 1965 to escape the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion; see below) were less involved in politics; but not unlike their earlier counterparts, these migrants usually settled with people from the same part of Sulawesi and, recalling Kopytoff’s model, reconstructed their own social order in frontier spaces. While those who migrated to Kalimantan and then to Johor and finally Sumatra were creating settlements with at least passive consent of local rulers and largely outside the control of colonial authorities, the Bugis who settled Balobaloang were clearly allied with representatives of the Dutch colonial government who were interested in instituting rust en orde (peace and order) and in exploiting their colonial subjects.7

Thus, from the late nineteenth century until World War II, the Dutch were concerned with making “legibility”; that is, subjugating and incorporating into the political center peripheral societies that occupied nonstate spaces (Scott 1998a, 1998b, 1999). Bugis migrants, increasingly under the control of the Dutch, were either in alliance with the colonial authorities or at least serving Dutch interests in pursuit of their own. Later, under the approving eye of the nation state of Indonesia, Bugis settlers would similarly continue to exploit niches in both agriculture and petty trade, increasingly at the expense of local populations.

**BUGIS MIGRATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE**

In 1950, shortly after Independence, the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion broke out in South Sulawesi and spread into Central Sulawesi (Harvey 1974). Meanwhile, a second secessionist rebellion was being waged against the leftist and militarist Sukarno government by the unlikely alliance of Muslim West Sumatra and mostly Christian North Sulawesi. As a result, for more than a decade, many rural villagers, caught between the Indonesian army and the guerrillas, were forced to flee (Harvey 1977). Thus began what Acciaioli (1989) notes was to become the largest Bugis migration since the devastation of Wajo’ two and a half centuries earlier. By 1960, the rebellion had weakened, but it did not end until 1965, when the last remaining rebels were attacked by forces of the National Army and Kahar Muzakkar was assassinated.

Among those who chose flight at that time were Bugis who settled in west Central Sulawesi on the highland plain near Lake Lindu, south of Palu (Acciaioli 1989, 2000). Earlier generations of Bugis who had settled in the region had established themselves in villages along the coast or in small Bugis kingdoms along the shores of Palu Bay. Beginning in 1957, however, the first of a succession of several groups of Bugis migrants escaping the violence of the rebellion arrived at Lake Lindu to settle in an area already inhabited by an established population of indigenous rice farmers. In 1967, the leader of the second and more enduring contingent settled on the Lindu plain after escaping the depredations of both army and
rebels in South Sulawesi, and wandered about the region for five years "in search of
good fortune," initiating a "classic...pioneer-inspired chain migration, where the
links [were] forged along the lines of preexisting kinship, but [were] maintained by
commercially-based relations" (Acciaioli 2000:223).

Although the lake had provided food for the local farmers, it had never been
exploited commercially. Seizing upon this opportunity, Bugis leaders settled along
its shore and established themselves as fishers and traders. Meanwhile, group leaders
called upon family members to join them and recruited non-Bugis from Lindu and
the surrounding region, developing patron-client networks in which more recent
arrivals fished while others opened land to irrigated rice horticulture. Often
unmarried men came to find work and eventually married into the patron's family.
Those who were most successful started their own businesses, either in fishing or
trade. Over several decades, the Bugis immigrants at Lindu opened the nearby lake
for the first time to commercial fishing, creating a marketing network through which
they were eventually able to dominate the local economy.

Acciaioli (2000) found, however, that Bugis attempts at domination of the area
went far beyond the economic sphere. As he explains,

They have also attempted to provide ideological justification of their dominant position in the local
context. As citizens of a nation state committed to development, the Bugis have billed themselves the
bringers of progress to the area, the only hope for developing Lindu along the lines the government
envisages, and hence the legitimate occupants of such roles as hamlet head [and other local offices].
Moreover, they have also sought to legitimate their position by their rediscovery of the fundamentally
Bugis basis of the local spiritual universe. (Acciaioli 1989:311)

That is, once the Bugis had gained knowledge of local ritual practices, they
reinterpreted them in light of Bugis customs (ade') and attempted to impose those
reinterpretations upon their neighbors.

Thus, while Bugis rebels were a problem for the emerging nation state of
Indonesia, Bugis migrants became exemplars of modernity and development under
the New Order. As part of its imposed plan for economic development, and to
advance Javanese political power, the government continued the late-colonial policy
of transmigration, wherein people from the overcrowded islands of Java and Madura
were relocated to the more sparsely settled parts of the outer islands, displacing
indigenous swidden cultivators, who were forced into lowland settlements or nearby
towns and cities. Bugis migrants, it appears, were the most numerous of the
"volunteer" migrants under the New Order. Bringing with them their culture,
religion, political structures, and their "market-economy strategy" (Pelras 1996:319
ff.), they came to dominate local markets and, at the same time, alienate indigenous
populations in East and West Timor, Ambon, and in Irian Jaya (now West Papua).

Until now I have been addressing what might be regarded as successful migration
and settlement. During the 1990s, however, there have been several prominent
instances of what might be seen as less-than-successful settlement; i.e., the recent
mass out-migrations of Bugis and other non-natives from East Timor, West Timor,
and Maluku, with perhaps more to come in West Papua and Kalimantan. Although
there are many historical differences, all have in common a rapid growth in the
tabers of Bugis immigrants who, during a period of economic boom, sought good
fortune in agriculture or as traders and owners of small businesses in urban markets.

Seen by development agencies, the Jakarta government, and the Bugis themselves
as a force for economic expansion and political integration, this immigrant population
increasingly came to be regarded by locals as intruders who were taking away their
economic and political power. In Dili, the capital of East Timor, Bugis and Makassar
immigrants by the early 1990s made up 80 per cent of the traders in the main
market. In predominantly Christian Ambon, Bugis merchants and other Muslims
began to build mosques in Christian neighborhoods and to take control of the
government bureaucracy. But by early 1999, most of the Bugis had fled these
provinces, many returning home to Sulawesi while others moved on to seek their
fortune in West Papua, Kalimantan, and other parts of Indonesia.

Preliminary research among three Bugis refugees from recent conflicts in Ambon,
Kupang, and Dili provides examples of how three particularly successful migrants
were able to take advantage of the economic expansion of the Suharto period and
Jakarta’s support for settlement, especially by Muslims in frontier areas. All three
men had returned with their families to Makassar in 1999 to avoid the violence that
had broken out between immigrant and indigenous ethnic groups in the places where
they had settled.

Haji A was born in 1966 in Pinrang, where he completed secondary school. He
left for Jayapura, capital of Irian Jaya (now West Papua), in 1986, hoping to find
employment as a civil servant or police officer. He traveled there with a visiting
family member who had settled there earlier. After two years of working in
construction for low pay and with no prospects of attaining his goal, he moved to
East Timor and worked for a Chinese tailor for six months, during which time he
was able to raise enough capital to open a small, successful business selling spices
in the Dili market. He liked living in Dili, but now plans to remain in Makassar.

Haji B was born in Sinjai in 1950. The same year, in order to avoid the conflict
brought about by the secessionist movement led by Kahar Muzakkar, his family
moved to Makassar (then known as Ujung Pandang). In 1966, he spent the school
year living with his uncle in Ambon. After completing secondary school in Makassar
with the support of his uncle, he returned to Ambon, where he attended university
and then went to work as a trader, exporting agricultural products from Ceram
(Indonesian: Seram) to Java. After losing money on an investment in a clove orchard,
he moved to Ambon and started a highly successful co-operative auto-repair shop
with members of several ethnic groups who had also suffered losses in cloves. He
still owns the land in Ceram and an interest in the repair shop, and he hopes to return
when the violence has ended.

Haji M was born in Boné in 1958. In 1974, he migrated to Kupang, West Timor,
where friends had already settled and were making money as traders in the market.
In Kupang, after one year selling clothing for a Chinese trader, he had raised enough
capital to open his own clothing business in the market. He sent what money he
could to Boné to buy land and invest in a business. Although Kupang still held good business prospects and he enjoyed living there, he has decided to settle in Makassar and develop his business there.

Each of these men has a different story, but similarities that emerged in interviews include:
- All three participated in chain migration; that is, all followed family members who helped them get established; others, in turn, followed them.
- All three worked for other people (often Chinese businessmen), saved money, and opened their own businesses in the market sector; one started a multiethnic automobile-repair shop; two bought agricultural land as well.
- All married and raised children where they had settled; two married women from their home district, one married a Chinese woman where he had settled.
- All maintained contact with home villages, purportedly through regular visits.
- All were successful in that they returned with assets of over 100 million Rupiah, with which they were able to start up small businesses.
- All agreed that although economic disparities had developed between immigrants and local populations, there was relative harmony between communities, and that it was “outside provocateurs” who had initiated the violent conflict that forced their eventual return to South Sulawesi.
- Only Haji B hopes to go abroad again once peace is established; the others plan to remain in Makassar.

Although this is a very small sample, I believe that the commonalities are significant when seen in the context of the history of Bugis migration as I have described it. Perhaps most apposite here is the fact that all three informants had amassed considerable savings while abroad and thus were able to return to South Sulawesi and buy small businesses, cars, and so on. That is, in a de-facto alliance with the New Order government, these men thrived, and while they and their families have prospered, many have not, moving on to other parts of Indonesia and Malaysia and still seeking good fortune.

DISCUSSION

*Bugis and the New Order*

Any discussion of the flight of Bugis, Javanese, and other migrant groups out of East Timor, West Timor, Ambon, etc., must take into account the political economy of Indonesia during the final decades of the twentieth century. Supported by global capital interested in exploiting Indonesia’s vast natural resources and consumer market and by American diplomatic and military backing, Indonesia under President Suharto realized substantial economic growth even as the political activities of individual citizens and parties were severely restricted. In late 1997, the pan-Asian economic crisis hit hard in Indonesia and was a catalyst in President Suharto’s fall from power in 1998. As transmigration and volunteer migration into already-
inhabited rural and urban frontier areas increased, so did the resentment of indigenous peoples, who felt culturally, politically, and economically displaced and disenfranchised in their own villages and cities.

The ruling elite’s misguided view seems to have been that progress (maju), principally economic, and the insinuation of progressively minded outsiders (i.e., educated bureaucrats and industrious entrepreneurs) into the less developed areas would create a grateful indigenous underclass. Emblematic of this view is a statement made by Indonesia’s prominent Muslim leader and first freely elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid. In November 1996, defending Indonesia’s military role in East Timor, Gus Dur (as he is widely known) said that the conflict in East Timor between the native peoples (mostly Catholics) and immigrant Muslims, including Bugis, was rooted in the wide economic gap between them, not religious differences. “The motivation of the East Timorese for getting rid of Bugis and Madura immigrants is social envy. This is perceived by many as a clash of religion. We need to understand this better. A failure to look into this matter seriously will mean fighting each other endlessly. There is no religious or ethnic problem between the East Timorese and the migrants but there is an economic problem” (Jakarta Post 1996).

What followed in Wahid’s remarks betrays an ideological interpretation that would probably find agreement among most Bugis and Javanese settlers who saw themselves as forces for economic development, but which would probably be rejected by most East Timorese. Echoing the opinions of many Javanese teachers and other civil servants in East Timor that the natives were simply too lazy, Gus Dur went on to claim that the main reason the East Timorese were not able to compete for jobs was because the migrants were more creative, tough, and disciplined. To emphasize his point, Gus Dur (Jakarta Post 1996) incorrectly continued, “Don’t forget the East Timorese learned to plow their fields only 15 years ago.” Thus, while arguing for the centrality of economics in the conflict, he deflected attention away from the fact that the non-Timorese, backed by the Indonesian military, maintained an economic stranglehold on the provincial government and economy, and placed the blame on the lack of industriousness of the East Timorese. In doing so, moreover, Wahid ironically participated in the perpetuation of the very stereotypes that he claimed were frustrating a peaceful resolution to the conflict and, I suspect, more deeply angered the East Timorese. Later, as president, Gus Dur continued to ignore the underlying ideological and economic problems that beset his troubled nation, and was seen by nearly all factions as ineffective at best. He was removed from office in November 1999, a little over a year after entering office.

The intention here is not to demean the former Indonesian president, but to show how the shared values of hard work and economic progress have made it easy for Western economists and Indonesian officials to simply assume that national integration will be realized if and when the rest of the population learns to follow the example of the Javanese and Bugis immigrants in their midst.
Among the social and cultural factors that have been attributed to Bugis migrants by both foreign writers and the Bugis themselves, the idea of good fortune provides a highly productive frame for understanding the meaning of both their presence in East Timor, West Timor, and Ambon, and their forced departure. At Lindu, Acciaioli (1989) found that Bugis immigrants often spoke of searching for good fortune as their primary motivation to migrate, a phrase that Acciaioli (1989:267) argues “entails a quest guided by some of the most basic tenets of Bugis culture. . . . [It is] a search for knowledge as well as riches, embracing a way of seizing one’s fate” which, it is hoped, will take the searcher well beyond the accumulation of material wealth to include the general good fortune that is accrued through life.

According to Acciaioli’s and my Bugis informants, material wealth which is displayed and/or shared with others is evidence of good fortune, while wealth that is hidden away in a miserly manner suggests that the person who is hiding it lacks the good fortune that will provide even more wealth in the future (or why would he or she not use it?). On another level, good fortune is evident in such things as respected status in one’s community, children and grandchildren, magical knowledge, and the blessings of God. Good fortune is the result of both fate and personal effort (hard work and frugality); one must be lucky and/or smart enough to be in the right place at the right time, to seize opportunities as they arise. In practice, Bugis emphasize that in a world dominated by economic and social commitments, hard work and the purposeful construction of a network of clients—many of whom are more recent Bugis immigrants—are necessary to sustain both oneself and others. These in turn provide the political and moral authority to mediate negotiations over cultural and social matters within their communities and, by extension, those communities to which they attach themselves.

While generations of Bugis migrants have sought and found good fortune in creating permanent communities for themselves, their clients, and progeny, others continue to move about searching for good fortune. Referring to recent interviews by Tanaka, Pelras (1996:325) points out that

Bugis migrants in Malaya and Sumatra are not traditional peasants but economy-minded entrepreneurs. In east Sumatra, in contrast to their Javanese neighbors, whose idea of success was the ability to acquire more rice fields or plantations in order to intensify and improve agriculture in the area, Bugis rice growers . . . thought further ahead. Once they had made enough money, they planned either to reinvest in transportation or commerce, or to rent out their land to Javanese farmers or Bugis newcomers and then move on in search of a more advantageous place.

My informants also reflect this tendency. All were able to return to Sulawesi with significant capital because they were always looking beyond the present, keeping their savings liquid and maintaining connections in their homeland. It will be interesting to see if, with peace restored, they move on once again.
CONCLUSION

There is, of course, no single cause nor simple explanation for the communal violence which has doggedly plagued Indonesia since the fall of Suharto. Likewise, there is no way to know the motivations and frustrations of each and every Bugis migrant who has found it necessary to flee these troubled provinces. Thus, while many questions remain about Bugis migration and its relationship to regional and national integration at this critical period in Indonesian history, one salient issue that has been raised by these returned migrants is their sense that there existed a state of relative harmony even as local populations were becoming increasingly marginalized economically and politically, and that outside forces disrupted that harmony. This, of course, is an attractive idea to many, including the Bugis (who can then minimize their own complicity), as it promises a restoration of harmonious relations once those outside forces have been identified and eradicated. On the other hand, the notion obscures the problems of increasingly rapid growth of migrant communities during the last several decades across Indonesia and the suppression of conflict under the Suharto regime. Thus, while Bugis settlement and entrepreneurship may be a progressive force in the Indonesian economy, their apparent historic disregard for the social and cultural institutions of indigenous peoples may be anachronistic as Indonesians search for new ways to share power and wealth in a free society.

NOTES

1. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, November 19, 1999, and at Hasanuddin University, Makassar, Indonesia, in August 2000. I thank Abdul Latif and A. M. Akhmar, of Hasanuddin University, for their help in locating and interviewing returned Bugis migrants in Makassar. I also appreciate the many helpful comments provided by those who read earlier drafts of this article, including Greg Acetiaioli, Diane Cieckawy, Elizabeth Collins, Jennifer Gaynor, Steven Rubenstein, James C. Scott, and two anonymous reviewers for Ethnology.
2. Among some, like the Javanese and Bugis, these outer islanders have been viewed literally as without religion, customary law, and even the ability to know shame/dignity (Indonesian: malu); that is, they are less than fully human.
3. In this regard they are unlike the Chinese, who have a reputation in Indonesia for being highly communal, and although they deal daily with members of other ethnic groups, tend to isolate themselves socially and culturally.
4. Much has been written on the history of growing Makassar and Bugis involvement in regional trade prior to the European incursion; see, for example, Hall 1981; Macknight 1975, 1993; Pelras 1996; Reid 1983; Abidin 1974.
5. It was customary in the region for women to assume the ethnic identities of their husbands, at least during the eighteenth century (Sutherland 1986). The daughters of Malay rulers who married Bugis men, and certainly their children, would thereby be considered ethnically Bugis.
6. As traders, the Bugis of Balobaloang were no strangers to smuggling. Elder navigators relish telling stories of slipping copra and other cargoes past Dutch authorities to avoid taxation.
7. It was around the turn of the century that the Dutch finally took control of all of South Sulawesi, abolishing the sultanates and appointing local leaders like the gallarrang of Balobaloang, who was responsible for enforcing compulsory labor and taxation (Pelras 1996).
8. Pelras (1996:269ff.) argues that the Bugis, as major regional players in the market economy and as adherents, for the most part, to a modern, democratic Islam, have “for centuries been predisposed to modernization and in some case have even anticipated it.”

9. The very term “outer islands” has come under attack in public discourse and is seen as a symbol of the historic marginality of the non-Javanese within Indonesia. This policy is a classic case of what Scott (1999) has described as the state constructing a nonstate space as a “frontier” even as it attempts to bring it under control.

10. During the 1980s, Suharto sought to expand his political base among the nation’s Muslim population. Embraced by his Minister for Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie, Suharto promoted a policy of ensuring that the 85:15 ratio of Muslims to non-Muslims in Indonesia was recreated in all levels of government, from the National People’s Assembly to local government offices. This became a source of great contention in the traditionally Christian area of Ambon.

11. Because of a widely fluctuating Rupiah during and since that time, it is hard to provide a precise value, but 100 million Rupiah probably was worth then between US$25,000 and US$50,000.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


